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NOTES AND COMMENTS

full recovery on the theory that if the accident accelerates death, which
otherwise might have been delayed for a considerable time, then it
must be held to be the sole and exclusive cause of the death despite
the concurrence of the disease in causing the fatality."1 A sizable
number of states, Indiana included, permit recovery so long as the
accident was the proximate cause of the death and the disease
was no more than the remote cause.1 2 However, a rule has been
developed which seems to effect a compromise betwen the too strict
majority doctrine and the proximate cause theory which is difficult
to apply, with the result that the intent of the parties is frequently
ignored. Courts following this ameliorating rule allow recovery where
the pre-existing condition was simply a normal incident of advancing
age or when the insured has pre-existing tendency to disease, but
deny recovery if disease was abnormal or malignant in its nature.18
Thus, cognizance is taken of the intent of the contracting parties and
yet deserving beneficiaries are not denied recovery. Although Indiana
is generally a disciple of the proximate cause doctrine,'4 it followed
the theory of distinguishing between minor frailties or the normal
infirmities of age and significant diseases in two well-reasoned appellate court cases.' 5
Rationally the principal case on the theory that the nature and
extent of the pre-existing diseases were of the character to prevent
recovery by a reasonable construction of the terms of the policy, the
decision can be sustained.

LABOR LAW
ORGANIZER'S RIGHT TO SPEAK
Appellant, a labor union president, in violation of a restraining
order issued by a Texas District Court pursuant to a Texas statute
requiring labor union organizers to file a written request for an
organizer's card before soliciting members for the union, addressed an
audience of oil workers. The meeting was part of a campaign to
organize the employees of an oil plant under the Oil Workers Indus11.

Benefit Assn. of Ry. Employees v. Armbruster, 217 Ala. 282,
116 So. 164, 166 (1928); Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Hoehn, 215
Ala. 109, 110 So. 7, 9 (1926); Note (1927) 25 Mich. L. Rev. 803.
12. Continental Casualty Co. v. Lloyd, 165 Ind. 52, 59, 60, 73 N.E.
824, 826 (1905); Inter-Ocean Cas. Co. v. Wilkins, 96 Ind. App.
231, 249, 250, 182 N.E. 252, 258 (1932); Kokomo Life and Accident Co. v. Walford, 90 Ind. App. 395, 400, 167 N.E. 156, 157,
158 (1929); Note (1930) 5 Ind. Law J. 298.
13. Leland v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 233
Mass 558, 564, 124 N.E. 517, 520 (1919); Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 254 N.Y. 81, 84, 85, 171 N.E. 914, 915
(1930).
14. See note 12 supra.
15. Policeman & Fireman's Ins. Assoc. v. Blunk, 107 Ind. App. 279,
287, 288, 20 N.E. (2d) 660 (1939); Railway Mail Assn. v. Schrader, 107 Ind. App. 235, 242, 19 N.E. (2d) 887, 889, 890 (1939).
1. Tex. Stat. (Vernon Supp. 1943) Art. 5154, Sec. 5.
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trial Union. Appellant invited all present to join and orally solicited
one employee. Held, guilty of contempt of court. Petition for a writ
of habeus corpus, denied.2 Held, reversed. The statute as applied
imposed a previous restraint upon appellant's rights of free speech
and assembly. Thomas v. Collins, U.S. - , 65 Sup. Ct. 315
3
The court applied the "clear and present danger" test,
(1944).
denying validity to the application of the "reasonable basis" test,'
relied upon by appellee.
A state may not, in imposing a licensing requirement upon the
soliciting of funds, vest discretion of issuance in the issuing authorities.5
But the Supreme Court has indicated that a statute merely requiring
previous identification of solicitors would be upheld upon the showing
of a social interest sufficient to justify the invocation of the state's
police power.6 Labor unions, like any other groups, are subject to
7
regulation by the states acting within the scope of their police power.
Nor does the fact that the Federal Government has legislated$ on
the subject under the commerce clause of the Constitution exclude
the exercise of the power." Regulation of matters of local concern and
within the states' police power which unavoidably involves some regulation of interstate commerce, but which, because of local character,
can not be effectively dealth with by Congress, has been left to the
states.10 Though Congress, under the commerce clause, may pre-empt
2.
3.

Ex Parte Thomas, 141 Tex. 591, 174 S. W. (2d) 961 (1943).
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47; see Mr. Justice Holmes dissenting in Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1923) and in Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919).
4. California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941); Clark v. Paul Gray,
Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939); Hendrick v. Maryland, 253 U.S. 610
(1914).
Appellee urged a standard analogous to that applied
under the commerce clause to sustain state statutes regulating
transportation.
5. Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308
U.S. 147 (1939).
6. People of State of New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278
U.S. 63, 72 (1928); see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940) at p. 305. "Without doubt a State may protect its citizens
from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose,
to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause
which he purports to represent." The Court in the principal case
found that the invitations to membership were inseperably interwoven into the speech and that therefore the First Amendment
would apply. The dissenting opinion, however, found no difficulty
in calling the transaction "solicitation," thus rendering the application of the statute constitutional.
7. See Allen Bradley Local no. 1111, United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
8. National Labor Relations Act, 29 USCA, §§ 151 et seq. (1935)
9. Wisconsin Labor Relations Board v. Fred Rueping Leather Co.,
228 Wis. 473, 279 N.W. 673 (1938).
10. Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 12 How. 299 (1851); Willson
v Black Bird Marsh Creek Co., 2 Pet. 245 (1829).
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the field, the intention to exclude the states from exercising their
police power must be clearly manifested."
The decision in the instant case rests on the theory that lawful
public meetings which do not immediately threaten social interests
entitled to state protection are not such as to require previous identification of the speakers. The Court, in invoking the "clear and present danger" test, confined its decision to the question of free speech
and assembly. It carefully avoided passing on the more troublesome
problem of state control of solicitation, which necessarily enters either
directly or indirectly, into all meetings of labor groups. If it is beyond
the orbit of state control, the situation presents an anomoly in light of
the "street soliciting" cases12 unless the National Labor Relations Act
may be said to preclude state action. If solicitation by union organizers may be subject to state control, the decision of the Thomas case
by no means makes certain at what point speaking favorably to unionism ends and solicitation begins.
11.
12.

See Kelley v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 10 (1937); Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933).
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1942); City of Manchester
v. Leiby, 117 F. (2d) 661 (1941); See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940), cited supra note 6.

